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Campaign Finance
Reform in Kentucky:
The Race for Governor
BY JENNIFER A. MOORE*
INTRODUCTION
P nor to 1992, campaign finance reform in Kentucky received
minor, if any, attention.' The only significant laws regarding
campaign finance banned corporate contributions and limited individual
contributions to $4000.2 Tius climate changed as a result of two major
events: the 1991 governor's race' and the BOPTROT investigation.4 In
* J.D. expected 1998, Umversity of Kentucky.
See Joe Terry, New Rules Changing Campaigns, KY. J., Apr./May 1995,
at 1.
2 SeeKY. REV STAT. ANN. §§ 121.025 (Michie 1984), 121.150(6) (Miclue
1986).
' In 1991, Democratic candidates raised between $2 and $4 million each.
Specifically, each Democratic candidate raised: Scotty Baesler, $2 million; Dr.
Floyd Poore, $2.6 million; Martha Wilkinson, $3.6 million; and the eventual
winner of the race for governor, Brereton Jones, $4 million. See Tom Loftus,
Big-Money Politic$, With Growing Pressure to Raise Vast Sums, Even
Candidates and Contributors Are Calling for Changes, COURIER-JOURNAL
(Louisville, Ky.), Dec. 29, 1991, at Al [hereinafter Loftus, Big-Money].
4 See Tom Loftus, BOPTROT. The Inside Story: 5 Years, 21 Convictions
Later, Probe to End, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), July 30, 1995, at Al
[hereinafter Loftus, The Inside Story]; Tom Loftus, Anatomy of a Scandal;
BOPTROT. The Inside Story, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), July 30, 1995,
at Dl.
BOPTROT signifies the "biggest, most successful investigation of public
wrongdoing m Kentucky." Id. The BOPTROT investigation acquired its name
from a "focus on the legislature's Business Organizations and Professions (or
BOP) committees and their handling of issues related to harness racing, the
trotters." Id. For Kentuckians, BOPTROT illustrated corruption in government
and is, therefore, often credited with bringing about campaign finance reform.
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1991, the total amount spent by all gubernatorial campaigns reached $19
million.' Not surprisingly, after spending around $4 million, Brereton
Jones emerged as the winner.6 The race for governor m Kentucky had
turned into a campaign of fundraising in which the candidate with the
most money wins7 - a process completely opposite from the one
envisioned: "'Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives?
Not the rich, more than the poor; not the learned more than the ignorant;
not the haughty heirs of distingished names, more than the humble sons
of obscure and unpropitious fortune.' ""
Coinciding with the increased costs of campaigns m Kentucky, the
BOPTROT investigation unveiled high levels of corruption m the state
and, in 1992, prompted the General Assembly to take action.9 For the
first time, the Kentucky General Assembly passed serious campaign
finance reform and became one of the few states in the country to adopt
a plan of public financing for its governor's race. 0 The Public Financ-
ing Campaign Act' established a matching fund for slates of candidates
for governor and lieutenant governor who voluntarily agree to a cap on
overall spending.'2 As a result of public funding and voluntary spending
limits, the cost of the 1995 governor's race decreased dramatically from
1991."3 This, in turn, reduced the effect of big money on the outcome
See Interview with Sheryl Snyder, an attorney at Brown, Todd & Heyburn, m
Louisville, Ky. (Nov. 7, 1996).
s See Loftus, Big-Money, supra note 3.
6 See id.
7 See id., see also Terry, supra note 1.
8 CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, MONEY IN POLITICS - REFORM:
PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS 3 (1996) [hereinafter CENTER FOR
RESPONSIVE POLITICS] (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison)).
9 See Terry, supra note 1.
10 See id.
'See KY. REv STAT. ANN. §§ 121A.005-.990 (Michie 1993 & Supp.
1996). For a general description and breakdown of the campaign finance laws of
all the states, including Kentucky, see STATE CAPITAL LAW FIRM GROUP,
LOBBYING, PACs, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE: 50 STATE HANDBOOK (Peter C.
Chnstianson et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter LOBBYING, PACs, AND CAMPAIGN
FINANCE].
12 See KY REV STAT. ANN. §§ 121A.020(2) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1996)
("the registry shall distribute transfers for the matching of qualifying contribu-
tions to a qualifying slate of candidates"), 121A.030(1) (Michie 1993 & Supp.
1996) (requmng qualifying slates to agree to a maximum spending amount of
$1.8 million).
13 See Terry, supra note 1.
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of the governor's race and also reduced the quid pro quo effect of such
large contributions. In addition, public financing restored the grass-roots
level of campaigning by allowing the candidates to focus on the issues
rather than raising money Public financing of the 1995 governor's race
benefitted all Kentuckians by removing the "for sale" sign from the office
of governor.'
4
In Part I, this Note examines the history of campaign finance reform
and, in particular, the development of the law in Kentucky Part II
provides a brief overview of the major provisions of Kentucky's current
campaign finance law As a specific example of the effects and success
of Kentucky campaign finance reform, Part Im focuses on the public
financing of the 1995 governor's race in Kentucky Part IV examines the
constitutional challenges to the Kentucky law and their probability of
success based on decisions rendered by the United States Supreme Court,
Kentucky courts, and the courts of other states with similar campaign
finance laws. Tus Note concludes with proposals for the Kentucky
General Assembly to consider regarding the future direction of campaign
finance reform in the state.
I. I-ISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
A. Early Reforms
Prior to the age of television and the immediacy of mass communica-
tion, campaign finance laws barely existed. The extent of campaign
finance laws in the Nineteenth Century consisted of bans on corporate
contributions 5 and prohibition of contributions from federal employ-
ees.6 After the turn of the century, the need for government regulation
14 See id., see also Sheryl G. Snyder, Reform Validated by Turnout,
COURIER-JOURNAL (Lomsville, Ky.), Nov. 26, 1995, at D3 (analyzing the high
voter turnout and the success of public funding m the 1995 governor's race).
15 See ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS: THE
MAKING OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW at xvi-xvii (1988) (examining
the history of campaign finance reform laws). A few states passed such laws due
to the growing influence of business in the political sphere during the industrial
revolution. See zd. at xvii.
16 See id. at xvi. In addition to creating the civil service system, the Civil
Service (Pendelton) Act of 1883, 22 Stat. 403 (codified as amended m scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.), prohibited candidates from soliciting campaign contribu-
tions from federal employees covered by the law. See MUTCH, supra note 15, at
xvi.
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of campaigns increased as more and more corporations contributed to and
influenced campaigns. 7 In 1907, Congress banned nationally-chartered
banks and corporations from contributing to federal campaigns." The
first federal campaign disclosure law, the Publicity Act,"9 passed
Congress in 1910, and the following year Congress amended the Act to
set overall expenditure limits of $5000 for House candidates and $10,000
for Senate candidates.2" However, the law proved ineffective when, in
1921, the Court held that Congress did not have the power to regulate
primary elections."' Congress responded in 1925 by passing the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act,22 which eliminated disclosure requirements for
primaries23 and increased the spending limit to $25,000 for Senate
" See Michael J. Merrck, Note, The Saga Continues - Corporate Political
Free Speech and the Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Reform: Austin v
Miclugan Chamber of Commerce, 24 CREIGHTON L. REv 195, 207 (1990). See
generally id. for a history of campaign finance reform.
18 See The Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864-65 (current version
at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1994)).
'9 The Publicity Act of 1910, Pub. L. No. 274, 36 Stat. 822 (requiring
post-election disclosure of receipts and expenditures by national party committees
and other multistate campaign committees for House of Representative races),
repealedby Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, § 318, 43 Stat. 1070,
1074.
20 See Publicity Act Amendments of 1911, Pub. L. No. 32, 37 Stat. 25, 28,
repealedby Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, § 318, 43 Stat. 1070,
1074. The amendments also extended disclosure requirements to Senate
campaigns and pre-election reporting. See id. 37 Stat. 25-27
2 SeeNewberryv. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921), overruled by United
States v Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). The question before the Court in
Newberry concerned Congress' power to regulate prumary elections. The Court
held that primaries are not within the reach of Congress because a "primary"
does not fit the accepted definition of an election, and thus Congress had no
constitutional authority under either Article I, § 4 or the Seventeenth Amend-
ment. See Newberry, 256 U.S. at 247 The Court, in Classic, included the
primary as an integral step m the election of a chosen representative. Contrary
to the opinion in Newbeny, the Court held that primary elections are within the
meamng of election as set forth m the Constitution. See Classic, 313 U.S. at
314.
22 Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, 43 Stat. 1070 (codified
at 2 U.S.C. §§ 241-256), repealed by Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,
Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3, 20 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455
(1994)).
23 See id.
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candidates m high-population states.24 These laws created the illusion of
campaign finance reform, but, in reality, they lacked enforcement and
effectiveness. For example, zero prosecutions resulted from the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act before the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
replaced it.25
B. Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA "')
After 1925, Congress took very little action on campaign finance
reform until 1971, when it passed the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971 ("FECA").26 The explanation for congressional inaction may relate
to the only slight increase in campaign spending from the 1920s to the
1950s27 and to the absence of major scandals during this period.2" The
cost of campaigning increased with the influx of televisions into
Amencan homes in the 1950s - which led candidates to spend more
money in order to purchase television commercials.
29
24 See id. at 1073.
25 See Campaign FinanceReform: Background, 6 CQ RESEARCHER 129, 130
(1996).
26 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1994)); see Merrick, supra note
17, at 208.
27 See ALEXANDER HEARD, THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY 402-03 (1960).
Heard found that the overall cost of national campaigning did not increase
between the 1920s and 1950s despite inflation and a larger electorate.
28 See MUTCH, supra note 15, at xviii. After the Teapot Dome Scandal in
the 1920s, no major election scandals occurred until Watergate in the early
1970s. See id. at 24-26. The Teapot Dome Scandal is the name given to events
transpiring in 1921 and 1922. The Secretary of the Interior leased government
land to oil developers without taking a bid. However, Harry F Sinclair, one of
the oil developers, gave cash to the Secretary. A Senate investigation revealed
that Sinclair gave money to the Republican Party in an "off-elections year."
Because the contribution came during a non-election year, it escaped disclosure
requirements. The controversy surrounding this affair led Congress to "require
political committees to report financial activity for all years." Id. at 24; see also
HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND
POLITICAL REFORM 1 (4th ed. 1992) (stating that election reform was "spurred"
by Watergate).
29 See Campaign Finance Reform: Background, supra note 25, at 130. In
1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower spent $6.6 million, which was three times the
amount spent by the Republican nominee in 1948. By 1968 campaign costs had
increased dramatically with the Republicans spending $25.4 million and the
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
In the aftermath of Watergate30 and the large sums of money spent
by President Nixon's re-election campaign in 1972,31 campaign finance
reform emerged as one of the foremost issues in the Ninety-third
Congress.32 For the first time in Umted States history, Congress passed
serious campaign finance reform when, in 1974, it amended FECA.a3
The new law created the Federal Election Commission ("FEC") to
administer and enforce the reforms,34 which included contribution limits
of $1000 from each individual to each candidate for each election35 and
$5000 from each political action committee ("PAC") to each candidate
for each election.36 The FECA amendments also set the maxmum
amount an individual or PAC may contribute to a national party
committee at $20,000 and $15,000, respectively 37 An individual or a
PAC may also contribute up to $5000 per year to other political
committees. However, an individual's aggregate annual total may not
exceed $25,000 in contributions.38 Other provisions of the 1974 Act
limited personal spending by candidates, set caps on overall campaign
spending depending on the office sought,39 and set a $1000 limit on
independent expenditures by individuals to a "clearly identified candi-
date. '40 In addition to these measures, the 1974 amendments re-enacted
Democrats $11.6 million. See id.
30 See, e.g., MUTCH, supra note 15, at 47-49. In 1972 five men connected
with President Nixon's Committee to Re-Elect the President broke into the
Democratic National Committee headquarters m the Watergate Hotel m
Washington, D.C. The arrest of these five men led to the uncovering of
numerous campaign finance law violations, a secret fund authorized by top
presidential aides, and the eventual resignation of President Richard M. Nixon.
The culmination of these events along with numerous other violations is
commonly referred to as "Watergate." See id.
"1 See ALEXANDER, supra note 28, at 20. In 1972 President Nixon's
campaign spent approximately $61.4 million. The Democratic candidate George
McGovern spent around $30 million. See id.
32 See id. at 1-9
3 See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1994)).
34 See 2 U.S.C. §§ 437c-438 (1994).
31 See zd. § 441a(a)(1)(A).
36 See id. § 441a(a)(2)(A).
37 See id. § 441a(a)(1)(B) & (2)(B).
38 See id. § 441a(a)(l)-(3).
39 See 18 U.S.C. § 608(a)(1) & (c) (Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1976).
40 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments, 88 Stat. at 1265; 18 U.S.C.
§ 608(e) (Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1976).
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the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 196641 by establishing
a tax check-off scheme to finance primary campaigns, party nominating
conventions, and general election campaigns.42
C. Buckley v Valeo
Soon after their passage, the FECA amendments met a roadblock
when the United States Supreme Court invalidated several provisions of
FECA as unconstitutional infringements on freedom of speech rights.43
The Court upheld the individual and PAC contribution limitations, the
reporting and disclosure requirements, and the public financing of
presidential campaigns.' However, the Court struck down the provisions
that limited a candidate's personal spending, overall campaign spending,
and independent expenditures.45 As a result of this landmark decision,
federal and state governments have tried to develop campaign finance
laws which combat the corrupting influence of money and the increasing
costs of campaigns while at the same time protecting an individual's right
to free speech.46
In Buckley, 1976 presidential candidate Senator James Buckley,
former Senator Eugene McCarthy, New York Civil Liberties Union
executive director Ira Glasser, and others challenged the constitutionality
of FECA as an infringement on free speech.47 The plamtiffs argued that
41 Presidential Campaign Fund Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-809, 80 Stat.
1587 (current version at 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9013 (1994)) (providing for public
subsidies to the national political parties for Presidential elections). See generally
Campaign Finance Reform: Background, supra note 25, at 132. In 1967
Congress suspended the provision and only retained the income tax checkoff.
Although Congress re-enacted the plan in 1971, President Nixon insisted that it
not take effect until after the 1972 election. See id.
42 See 26 U.S.C. § 9006 (1994).
41 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
" See id. at 143.
4- See id. at 58-59.
46But see Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic
Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049 (1996)
(challenging the basic assumptions of campaign finance reform and asserting that
reforms do not reduce corruption or protect free speech).
" See MUTCH, supra note 15, at 49-50. The plaintiffs in Buckleyrepresented
a diverse group including conservative organizations such as the American
Conservative Umon, Human Events, Inc., and the New York Conservative Party
as well as liberal individuals, such as Stewart Mott, heir to General Motors. See
1996-97]
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"limiting the use of money for political purposes constitutes a restriction
on communication violative of the First Amendment, since virtually all
meaningful political communications in the modem setting involve the
expenditure of money "' In examining the theory that money equals
speech m the political sphere, the Court distinguished between pure
speech and "symbolic" speech, and categorized contributions by
individuals as a form of "symbolic expression of support."'' The Court
concluded that a limitation on the amount of money does "not in any way
infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues. 50
However, the Court recognized the need to protect freedom of speech and
determined that the government must present a compelling interest in
order to restrict any speech.51 Based on this reasoning, the Court upheld
the provisions limiting individual and PAC contributions to $1000 and
$5000, respectively 52 The Court determined that the compelling
governmental interest to prevent "corruption and the appearance of
corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence of large
financial contributions on candidates' positions and on their actions if
elected to office" 3 satisfied the test.54 The defendants also argued for
the validity of the Act based on the assumption that Congress should
ensure political equality and the integrity of the democratic process.55
The Court did not focus on these latter two government interests and,
instead, upheld certain provisions of the Act based on the corrupting
influence of money in the election process.
It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary purpose - to
limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large
id.
48 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 11.
49 Id. at 21.
SO Id. See generally J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is
Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976) (discussing the different viewpoints
of money as speech and money as speech-related conduct).
-1 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24-25.
52 See id. at 23-36.
13 Id. at 25.
-4 See id. at 29
15 See id. at 25-26. See generally J. Skelly Wright, Money and the
Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political
Equality?, 82 CoLUM. L. REv 609 (1982) (arguing that the decisions in Buckley
and First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) perpetuate
inequality m the name of the First Amendment).
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individual financial contributions - in order to find a constitutionally
sufficientjustification for the $1,000 contribution limitation. To the
extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quidpro
quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our
system of representative democracy is undermined. Although the scope
of such pernicious practices can never be reliably ascertained, the deeply
disturbing examples surfacing after the 1972 election demonstrate that
the problem is not an illusory one.
Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo
arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming
from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a
regime of large individual financial contributions. 6
The Court justified contribution limits based on the need to combat
the quid pro quo effect of large contributions. However, the Court
determined that the limits on independent expenditures do not serve a
compelling government interest and fail the strict scrutiny test under the
First Amendment.57 The defendants argued that limits on expenditures
decreased the possibility of circumvention of contribution limits. The
Court did not accept this argument, because expenditure limits, unlike
contribution limits, constitute a direct limit on speech.5
[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements
of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is
wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which was designed "to secure
'the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagoistic sources,"' and "'to assure unfettered interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people."'
59
Following this same logic, the Court struck the provisions limiting
expenditures by the candidate and his or her family as well as overall
56 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27 But see Frank J. Sorauf, Politics, Experience,
and the First Amendment: The Case ofAmencan Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM.
L. REv 1348, 1349-50 (1994) (asserting the Court erred in dismissing without
discussion the strong government interest in protecting the integrity of the
democratic process).
7 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45.
5 See id. at 58.
59 Id. at 48-49 (quoting New York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
266, 269 (1964) (quoting Associated Press v United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1945))).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
campaign expenditure limits.6" The Court held that the limit on a
candidate's use of personal funds "imposes a substantial restraint on the
ability of persons to engage in protected First Amendment expression."61
The Court determined that contribution limits and disclosure requirements
satisfy the government interest m safeguarding the integrity of the
democratic process by preventing corruption and the appearance of
corruption. Unlike the contribution limits, the limits on expenditures and
overall spending do infringe on the individual's or the candidate's nght
to engage in political debate.62
The plaintiffs also challenged the Presidential Election Campaign
Fund Act, which established public financing for primary and general
presidential campaigns and party nominating conventions. They based
their constitutional claims on the assumption that public financing
resulted in the government sponsoring the two major political parties at
the expense of minor and new parties and independent candidates.63
However, the Court decided that Congress' decision to fund presidential
candidates at disproportionate rates does not violate the Constitution
because "the Constitution does not require Congress to treat all declared
candidates the same for public financing purposes."' Moreover, the
plaintiffs challenged the entire notion of public financing as unconstitu-
tionally infringing on a candidate's right to freedom of speech. Contrary
to the plaintiffs' assertion, the reason for public financing of presidential
elections is "not to abridge, restrict, or censor speech, but rather to use
public money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation
in the electoral process."6 The Court upheld public financing with
voluntary expenditure limits as long as the candidates can choose whether
to accept public funds.
Congress may engage in public financing of election campaigns and
may condition acceptance of public funds on an agreement by the
candidate to abide by specified expenditure limitations. Just as a
candidate may voluntarily limit the size of the contributions he chooses
60 See zd. at 51-54.
61 Id. at 52. The Court noted that overall expenditure limits would pass
constitutional scrutiny if agreed upon voluntarily in connection with acceptance
of public financing. See id. at 57 n.65.
62 See id. at 58.
63 See id. at 85-108.
64 1d. at 97
65 Id. at 92-93.
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to accept, he may decide to forgo private fundraismg and accept public
funding.66
As a result of Buckley, contribution limits on individuals and PACs
remain valid as do the disclosure and reporting requirements, public
financing of presidential campaigns, and the role of the FEC.67
D. Recent Reforms
During the 1980s, the costs of campaigns 68 and the number of PACs
increased dramatically 69 However, Congress failed to combat these
spiraling numbers with any major reform.7" The 1990s have not seen
much m the way of reform on the national level. Instead, measures to
reform campaign finance laws have turned into partisan debates and, as
a result, most efforts have been thwarted by presidential vetoes7' and
threatened filibusters.72 Although the federal government has failed to
66 Id. at 57 n.65.
67 See id. at 143.
68 From 1976 to 1988 "spending by statewide and legislative candidates
increased by 450 percent: from $120 million to $540 million." CENTER FOR
RESPONSIVE POLITCS, 10 MYTHS ABOUT MONEY IN POLITCs 12 (1995); see
also HERBERT E. ALEXANDER & ANTHONY CORRADO, FINANCING THE 1992
ELECTION 3-7 (1995) (estimating that total campaign spending in the 1992
elections reached $3.2 billion, almost triple the 1980 cost of $1.2 billion).
69 PACs numbered 1949 at the end of 1978 and by the end of the 1980s the
number of PACs had increased to 4677 See THOMAS GAIS, IMPROPER
INFLUENCE: CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW, POLITICAL INTEREST GROUPS, AND THE
PROBLEM OF EQUALITY 49 (1996).
70 See generally Helen Dewar, Complex Forces Halt Campaign Finance
Reform, WASH. POST, July 8, 1996, at Al (providing a summary of major
proposed legislation which was not introduced or failed to pass Congress).
7 For example, in 1992, President George Bush vetoed a bill to provide
partial public financing for congressional races and set voluntary congressional
spending limits. Congress failed to override the veto by the necessary two-thirds
vote. See SENATE LIBRARY, PRESIDENTIAL VETOES, 1989-1994, S. Pub. 103-13,
at 7 (1994).
72 SeeHelenDewar, Senate Kills Campaign FinanceBill, WASH. POST, June
26, 1996, at A4. The latest reform effort occurred in 1996 when Senators John
McCam (R-Anz.) and Russell Femgold (D-Wis.), in a bipartisan effort, proposed
a bill to set voluntary limits on congressional campaign spending, including
incentives for compliance, such as free broadcast time and reduced postage rates.
The plan also proposed a ban on all contributions from PACs and a prohibition
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
revise campaign finance law, significant changes have occurred on the
state level, including reforms in Kentucky
E. Kentucky's Campaign Finance History
At the turn of the century, Kentucky's campaign finance laws did not
differ from those of the federal government. In other words, no substan-
tial laws existed.73 However, the delegates to the 1890 Kentucky
Constitutional Convention, concerned about corporate influence, adopted
several provisions relating to corporations, including one prohibiting
corporations from influencing elections and voters.74 In 1916, the
General Assembly expanded the Constitutional provision by passing the
Corrupt Practices Act.75 In the Act, the legislature expressed its intent:
to promote pure elections, primaries, and conventions, and to prevent
corrupt practice in the same; to limit the expenses of candidates; to
prescribe the duties of candidates and providing penalties and remedies
for violations, and declaring void, under certain conditions, elections in
which these provisions or any of them have been violated.
76
The main provision of the Act banned corporations from directly or
indirectly contributing "any money, service or other thing of value
towards the nomination or election of any office."'77 This prohibition
still exists in Kentucky in virtually the same language as the 1916 Act.7"
The next major change in Kentucky law occurred in 1966 when the
on most soft money expenditures. After proponents failed to achieve the required
number of votes to end the filibuster led primarily by Senator Mitch McConnell
(R-Ky.), the bill was tabled and no action was taken. See id. For a more in depth
analysis of S. 1219, see LARRY CRAIG, S. 1219 - SENATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE
BILL (Government Press Release) (Federal Document Clearing House 1996).
" Most states did not address campaign finance reform in the Eighteenth
and early Nineteenth Centuries. The extent of such laws consisted of bans on
contributions from corporations effective in only Nebraska, Missouri, Tennessee,
and Florida. See MUTCH, supra note 15, at xvii.
74 See KY. CONST. § 150.
7S 19 16 Ky. Acts 53.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 See KY. REv STAT. ANN. § 121.025 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1996).
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General Assembly established the Kentucky Registry of Election Finance
as an independent agency to administer and regulate the campaign finance
laws.7 9 However, the General Assembly failed to grant the Registry any
real power and, as a result, the Registry remained understaffed and
underfinanced to the point that no one took the law or the Registry's
actions seriously "
Kentucky also responded to the scandals emerging from the Water-
gate era and amended its campaign finance laws again in 1974.1' The
1974 Act increased the power of the Registry to oversee all election
financing and granted the Registry the power to initiate civil actions to
enforce compliance. As a result of the 1974 Act, "[t]he Registry became
a 'watchdog' over election financing to insure that Kentucky's elections
would not be corrupted."82 Although amendments in 1980 again
increased the power of the Registry,83 serious reform m Kentucky still
did not exist. Aside from the ban on corporate contributions, the only
other significant provision in the law imposed a limit of $3000 on
individual contributions which the General Assembly raised to $4000 in
1986.84 However, no one adhered to the disclosure and reporting
requirements because the penalty for violating the law usually resulted in
an insubstantial civil penalty of $100.85 Joe Terry, former chair of the
Registry, argues that "one hundred dollars is not going to stop anything,
the penalties had to be large enough to make someone take a second look
before acting." 86 Campaign finance reform m Kentucky underwent little
or no change until 1992.
79 See 1966 Ky. Acts 903 (codified as amended at KY. REv STAT. ANN. §
121.110 (Miclue 1993 & Supp. 1996)).
80 See Terry, supra note 1.
81 See The Corrupt Practices Act of 1974, 1974 Ky. Rev Stat. & R. Serv
697 (Banks-Baldwin) (codified as amended at KY. REv STAT. ANN. §§ 121.015-
.990 (Miclue 1993 & Supp. 1996)).
82 Naegele Outdoor Adver. Co. v Moulton, 773 F.2d 692, 699 (6th Cir.
1985).
83 See id.
84 See 1986 Ky. Acts 222 § 4(6) (codified as amended at KY REv STAT.
ANN. § 121.150(6) (Miclue Supp. 1986)). This amount has since been lowered
to $1000. See KY. REv STAT. ANN. § 121.150(6) (Michie Supp. 1996).
85 See 1992 Ky. Acts 830 § 30 (codified as amended at KY. REv STAT.
ANN. § 121.990 (Micle 1993 & Supp. 1996)).
86 Interview with Joe Terry, former chair of the Kentucky Registry of
Election Finance, a Lexington attorney, and a board member of the Kentucky
Center for Public Issues, in Lexington, Ky. (Nov. 6, 1996).
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I. KENTUCKY CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW
Spending m the 1991 governor's race 7 coupled with the mvestiga-
tions and convictions resulting from BOPTROT,s8 led to massive reform
measures in the 1992 General Assembly 9 According to Joe Terry,
former chair of the Kentucky Registry of Election Finance, "the reforms
m 1992 were brought about by an atmosphere of corruption in govern-
ment a general feeling that Frankfort was for sale [due to] the
crescendo effect of more and more money [being] spent m each
gubernatorial race leading up to the [Martha] Wilkinson and [Brereton]
Jones race in 1991."9' BOPTROT, the investigation conducted by the
FBI, led to the convictions of more than a dozen state legislators and
lobbyists for receiving illegal contributions and bribes as low as $400, as
well as the conviction of the Speaker of the Kentucky House of
Representatives and the governor's director of appointments. 9' During
this period, Kentucky witnessed the most costly gubernatorial race in state
history Total expenditures m gubernatorial elections increased almost
seven hundred percent from 1975 to 1991.92 Approaching the 1992
session of the General Assembly, public sentiment could only be
characterized as disgust toward the level of corruption in state govern-
ment and the "for sale" sign on the governor's office. In addition to the
climate produced by BOPTROT and the 1991 governor's race, the media
pushed for reform by publishing numerous articles supporting lower
contribution limits and public financing in order to combat the quid pro
quo effect of contributions from businesses seeking state contracts.93 In
response, State Senator Mike Moloney proposed a long overdue plan
which brought Kentucky to the forefront of campaign finance laws.
According to Terry, campaign finance reform in Kentucky would not
have happened if it had not been for the determination of Moloney 94
87 See Loftus, Big-Money, supra note 3.
88 See generally Loftus, The Inside Story, supra note 4 (providing a
summary of the BOPTROT investigation).
89 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
90 Interview with Joe Terry, supra note 86.
9' See Loftus, The Inside Story, supra note 4.
92 See PENNY M. MILLER, KENTUCKY POLITICS AND GOvERNMENT: Do WE
STAND UNITED? 219-26 (1994).
93 See, e.g., Tom Loftus, Three Part Series; Big Money Politic$, COURIER-
JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Dec. 15, 22, & 29, 1991.
94 See Interview with Joe Terry, supra note 86.
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Moloney first announced his plan in November 1990.'5 Moloney
outlined a scheme for partial public financing for the office of governor
and the other state constitutional offices96 as well as other limitations on
campaign spending.97 At the time Moloney announced his plan, the four
major Democratic candidates m the 1991 governor's race had already
reported raising $7.2 million.98 After the 1991 governor's race, m winch
total expenditures exceeded $19 million,99 Moloney decided to take
action. Moloney developed a plan to combat the increasing costs of the
governor's race, and in particular to address the problem of "millionaire"
candidates who join the race and spend vast amounts of their own money,
only to be repaid by contributions once elected.'00 For example, in 1987
Wallace Wilkinson and Brereton Jones loaned their campaigns for
governor and lieutenant governor more than $2.3 million and $1 million,
respectively ... In addition to campaign costs, Moloney was concerned
with businesses "contributing the maximum amount of money time and
time again and bundling vast sums of money, then, m turn, seeing these
same individuals receive the no-bid contracts from the administration they
contributed to in the campaign or even after the election.' 0 2 The
culmination of tis practice, along with the enormous amount of spending
in the 1991 governor's race, led Moloney to begin discussing his plan
with others, including Joe Terry and Ray Wallace from the Registry,'0 3
9' See Tom Loftus, Moloney Plan Urges Some Public Funds for State
Campaigns, COURMR-JOURNAL (Lousville, Ky.), Nov. 22, 1990, at B1
[hereinafter Loftus, Moloney Plan].
96 The other state constitutional offices are: treasurer; auditor of public
accounts; commissioner of agriculture, labor, and statistics; secretary of state;
attorney general; and lieutenantgovernor. See KY. CONsT. § 91. Public financing
for the other state constitutional officers never developed, and any future change
remains unlikely and potentially unnecessary due to the relatively low amounts
of money spent in the campaigns. Interview with former state Senator Michael
Moloney, in Lexington, Ky. (Nov 5, 1996).
9' See Loftus, Moloney Plan, supra note 95, at B1.
98 See id.
99 See Loftus, Big-Money, supra note 3, at A15.
,"o See Interview with former state Senator Michael Moloney, supra note 96.
Governors John Y Brown, Jr. (1979-1983), WallaceWilkmson (1987-1991), and
Brereton Jones (1991-1995), all millionaires, loaned theircampaigns considerable
amounts of money. See Terry, supra note 1, at 2.
10, See Loftus, Big-Money, supra note 3.
,02 Interview with former state Senator Michael Moloney, supra note 96.
103 Ray Wallace served as the Executive Director of the Registry of Election
Finance. See Al Cross, Jones Returns $11,500 at the Request of Three Campaign
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and outlining a reform proposal. °4 Moloney urged that something be
done in order to restore integrity to the democratic process. Instead of the
office of governor going to the highest bidder, all qualified candidates
must be given a chance. Moloney found the answer to reducing corrup-
tion and leveling the playing field by publicly financing campaigns and
lowering the limits on contributions by individuals. °5 The main propos-
als consisted of lowering the contribution limit; controlling bundling by
corporations, labor unions, and other orgamzations; reforming the
distribution of no-bid contracts; and, most importantly and controversial-
ly, financing the governor's race in part with public funds.0 6
A. Limits on Contributions by Individuals and PACs
Limits on contributions by individuals and PACs have long been used
as a means to control corruption in government. For years, Kentucky
limited contributions to $3000 and then in 1986 the General Assembly
increased the limit to $4000.17 These limits placed Kentucky among
the least restrictive states that imposed any type of limit.' 8 Even at the
national level, the government limits contributions by an individual to
$1000 per candidate per election.'0 9 In 1992, Governor Jones supported
Contributors, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), July 3, 1991, at Bl.
104 See Interview with former state Senator Michael Moloney, supra note 96.
..5 See Loftus, Moloney Plan, supra note 95. United States Senator Mitch
McConnell, a devoted opponent of campaign finance reform on the national
level, publicly opposed Moloney's plan for partial public financing and voluntary
spending limits for the governor and lieutenant governor's race. Instead of
adopting Moloney's plan, McConnell urged lowering the contribution limits from
$4000 and banning contributions by PACs. See Tom Loftus, Campaign
Spending; McConnell Tells GOP to Oppose Reform Plan, COURIER-JOURNAL
(Louisville, Ky.), Jan. 10, 1992, at B3.
106 See Interview with former state Senator Michael Moloney, supra note 96.
107 See 1986 Ky Acts. 222 § 4(6) (codified as amended at KY REv STAT.
ANN. § 121.150(6) (Michie 1993) (subsequently amended, see KY. REV STAT.
ANN. § 121.150(6) (Michie Supp. 1996)). See supra note 84 and accompanying
text.
'08 See Loftus, Big-Money, supra note 3. Nineteen states still do not unpose
any limit on the amount individuals or PACs can contribute to campaigns.
Nevada and Wisconsin limit only individual contributions for statewide offices
to $10,000. Two states - South Dakota and Wyoming - limit individual
contributions whereas PAC contributions remain unlimited. See CENTER FOR
RESPONSIVE POLITICS, supra note 8, at 22-24.
109 See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1) (1994) ("No person shall make contributions
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a $100 limit on individual contributions which many argued was too low
and would require candidates to spend even more time fundraising."'
In his article, Terry emphasized that one of the goals of the 1992 reforms
was "increas[ing] the importance of small, individual contributions.'
Grady Stumbo, who ran two unsuccessful races for governor, supported
lowenng the contribution limit m order "'to give power back to the $25
contributor [and] make it count for something.""' 2 Although the
General Assembly rejected Jones' proposal, in 1992, it still drastically
lowered the contribution limit from $4000 to $500.'1
In 1996, however, the General Assembly passed House Bill 695
which increased the limit to $1000"1 - the same as the federal limit.
This provision limits to $1000 per election the amount an individual or
PAC can contribute to a candidate, campaign committee, or political issue
committee supporting or opposing a question on the ballot.1 5 In a
recent interview, former state Senator Moloney stated that the increase
was a "mistake we didn't need to do it we proved we could raise
the money to run for governor without doing it $500 is plenty ""6
However, the increase will make it easier for participating slates to reach
the $300,000 threshold at which the slate becomes eligible for public
- (A) to any candidate and Ins authorized political committees with respect to
any election for Federal Office which, in the aggregate, exceed $1000 ").
,' See Loftus, Big-Money, supra note 3. Notably, Minnesota's law which
limited contributions to $100 was held to be "so low as to infringe upon the
citizens' First Amendment right to political association and free political
expression." Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1365 (8th Cir. 1994) (considerng
constitutional challenges to campaign finance reform in Minnesota), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 936 (1995).
... See Terry, supra note 1, at 3.
,12 Tom Loftus, Campaign Panel Favors StncterGiftLimits, Public Funding,
COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Sept. 27, 1990, at B 1 [hereinafter Loftus,
Campaign Panel] (quoting Stumbo, who advocated lowering the maximum
contribution limit of $4000 per election to $1000).
113 See 1992 Ky. Acts 824 § 25(6) (current version at KY. REV STAT. ANN.
§ 121.150(6) (Michie Supp. 1996)).
,,4 See KY REV STAT. ANN. § 121.150(6) (Michie Supp. 1996). The limit
decreases to $100 per election for contributions to a candidate for school board.
See id.
115 See id. For a brief overview of Kentucky's public financing law, see W
Terry McBrayer & Margaret M. Young, Kentucky, in LOBBYING, PACs, AND
CAMPAIGN FINANCE, supra note 11, at 427
,,6 Interview with former state Senator Michael Moloney, supra note 96.
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matching funds.117 This will enable slates to divert attention from
fundraisng.' 18 While opponents argue that the increase will result m a
return to the quid pro quo effect of large contributions," 9 this should
not be the case considenng that $1000 is not a significant amount of
money compared to the entire amount raised in a campaign.
In order to prevent the appearance of corruption in campaigns, the
law prohibits any type of cash contribution to slates of candidates for
governor and lieutenant governor and limits cash contributions to $50 per
election to other candidates, PACs, political issues committees, or party
executive committees. 0 The law also restricts candidates, PACs, issues
committees, or executive committees from receiving anonymous
contributions in excess of $1000 in the aggregate per election.' 2' An
individual may make an anonymous contribution up to $50 per elec-
tion.' The law also limits the total amount an individual can contrib-
ute to PACs at $1500 a year1 and limits the amount an individual can
contribute to party executive committees at $2500 a year.1 24 These
limits help increase the importance of small, individual contributions by
reducing the disparities among large donors, small donors, and non-
donors.' 25 Although the state's pnmary interest in limiting individual
and PAC contributions is to prevent corruption and the appearance of
corruption, the state interest in providing a level playing field and
restoring integrity to the electoral process is also served by preventing
one individual from contributing large sums of money into one cam-
paign. 2 s In effect, the elimination of large contributions destroys the
". See infra Part III (notes 161-99 and accompanying text) for a full
description of the public financing system.
s See Interview with Sheryl Snyder, supra note 4.
"1 See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
120 See KY REv STAT. ANN. § 121.150(4) (Michie Supp. 1996).
121 See id. § 121.150(3).
122 See id.
123 See id. § 121.150(10). Prior to 1993 the limit was $4000 per year. See
1993 Ky. Acts 37
124 See Ky. REv STAT. ANN. § 121.150(11) (IMichie 1993 & Supp. 1996).
Prior to the 1992 amendment the limit was $6000 per year. See 1992 Ky Acts
824.
125 See CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, supra note 8, at 13 (arguing that
PAC and individual contributions must be limited in order to affect the disparity
of political influence, otherwise candidates will "depend even more on large
individual contributors," id. at 4).
126 For a discussion of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Buckley v. Valeo,
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concern over a quid pro quo effect, especially in the situation of a
gubernatorial candidate who will later, if elected, decide upon the
recipients of no-bid contracts and state appointments.
27
B. Bundling and No-Bid Contracts
While contribution limits do reduce the disparity between large and
small donors, three major loopholes in the law allow many to circumvent
the limits: bundling, soft money, and independent expenditures. Bundling
is the "practice of pooling individual contributions from employees of the
same corporation, people in the same profession or trade group, or
persons who share the same concern or ideology "'2 Bans on bundling
are not very common. Currently, only three states (Oregon, Missouri, and
Washington) have passed such laws - all by ballot initiative."' Instead
of directly banning bundling, Kentucky attempts to combat the problem
of bundling in other ways. For years, Kentucky has banned contributions
from corporations m order to reduce their political influence. 30 Al-
though unincorporated entities, such as labor unions, are allowed to
contribute to campaigns, like individuals, they are subject to limita-
tions. '
In 1992, the General Assembly set out to control bundling efforts.
For too long, corporations in Kentucky had used bundling as a means to
circumvent the ban on corporate contributions by bundling contributions
from employees, their spouses, and others." 2 In 1991, the Campaign
424 U.S. 1 (1976), that the government's interest in preventing corruption meets
constitutional muster, see supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
127 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
128 CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, supra note 8, at 14.
129 See id.
130 See Ky. REV STAT. ANN. § 121.025 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1996)
(prohibiting direct and many indirect forms of contributions from corporations).
A total of 21 states prohibit corporate contributions and 19 others limit
contributions from corporations in some way. Only 10 states allow unlimited
contributions from corporations. See CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, supra
note 8, at 22-24.
131 See CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, supra note 8, at 23.
132 See Tom Loftus, 1992 Legislature; Campaign Spending; Report Says the
Public Wants "Bundling" to End, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky ), Jan. 9,
1992, at B5. In 1991, the Kentucky Center for Public Issues joined with the 1990
class of Leadership Kentucky to form a council on Campaign Finance and
Electoral Reform which held town forums across the state. See id.
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Finance and Electoral Reform Policy Council published a report stating
that "[s]uch bundling of contributions was perceived to be a pervasive
problem and at the heart of the belief that state government in Kentucky
is for sale."' 3 The reform package accomplished this in three major
ways: strengthening the reporting requirements, limiting aggregate
contributions to certain entities, and restricting the awards of state no-bid
contracts and state appointments.
First, slates of candidates for governor and lieutenant governor are
required to file monthly reports of all contributions and expenditures until
the fifty-six days preceding the primary and general election, when slates
must report every fourteen days. A final report is required thinty days
after the election and every thirty days thereafter until all financial
obligations are fulfilled.'34 PACs and state and county executive
committees must also list in the report contributors' names, addresses,
employers, and spouses' employers for all contributions in excess of
$100.' This provision provides a check against bundling to see how
many employees, or spouses of employees, of a particular corporation
contribute. For example, Merit Financial Corporation contributed about
$47,000 to Wilkinson in 1987 and, although the Cincinnati securities firm
did not conduct much business in Kentucky prior to that time, it soon
became the largest co-manager of state bond issues in Wilkinson's first
two years as governor.'36 The new reporting requirements will allow the
Registry to monitor the actual source of contributions and to determine
whether or not corporations are the true contributors. However, reporting
and disclosure requirements only provide mimmum restraints on such
bundling efforts.
Second, the 1992 reforms decreased the aggregate amount that a
person 3 7 can contribute to all PACs to $1500 a year and to a state
political party to $2500 a year. 3 ' Third, and most effectively, the
General Assembly restricted the awards of no-bid contracts and state
133 Id.
134 See KY REv STAT. ANN. § 121A.020(5) (Michle 1993 & Supp. 1994).
Tius subsection places the same requirements on states rejecting expenditure
limitations and fundraisers for slated candidates registered pursuant to KY. REV
STAT. ANN. § 121.170(2).
131 See id. § 121.180(2), (5) & (6)(a). For a complete listing of the reporting
requirements, see id. § 121.180.
136 See Loftus, Big-Money, supra note 3.
137 Under KY. REv STAT. ANN. § 121.150(1 1), a PAC is considered to be
a "person." Advisory Opimon 93-001.
138 See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
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appointments. Businesses competing for no-bid contracts in Kentucky
greatly influence the race for governor."9 Although corporate contribu-
tions have been illegal in Kentucky since early this century,"40 corpora-
tions and other businesses circumvent the ban by bundling individual
contributions and donating to a campaign. "' This results in a quid pro
quo effect in which the candidate who wins the election decides who will
receive no-bid contracts 42 and these contracts often are awarded to
businesses who contributed to the campaign. 141 The enormous political
influence businesses had over the office of governor led to significant
reforms regarding reporting of contributions and expenditures and the
awarding of contracts.
The law imposes a prohibition on the awarding of no-bid contracts
by elected officials to:
any entity whose officers or employees, or the spouses of officers or
employees, knowingly contributed m excess of five thousand dollars
($5,000) in the aggregate in any one (1) election to the election
campaign of the elected official during the term of office following the
election campaign in which the contributions were made.' 4
If tlus law had been in effect during Governor Brereton Jones' adminis-
tration, about one hundred of Jones' top donors would have been
forbidden from receiving either no-bid contracts or appointments. 145
Furthermore, the law prohibits any fundrmser from receiving a no-bid
"3 See supra notes 96-106 and accompanying text; infra notes 142-48 and
accompanying text.
140 See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
141 See Interview with former state Senator Michael Moloney, supra note 96.
142 See id.
4' For example, in 1988, Governor Wilkinson cancelled a contract with one
architectural firm worth about $2.65 million and instead the administration
awarded the contract to a firm that contributed about $51,000 to Wilkinson. As
a result, the ongmal firm filed suit and the state settled for $95,000. For a short
summary of this and other contributions by special interests and the awards of
no-bid contracts, see Loftus, Big-Money, supra note 3.
'44 KY. REV STAT. ANN. §121.330(1) (Michie 1993).
145 See Robert T. Garrett, Campaign-Finance Compromise Weighed; Plan
Meant to Make Partial Public Funding More Alluring, COURIER-JOURNAL
(Loisville, Ky.), Feb. 11, 1992, at Al. One should note that the 100 donor
statistic was based on the threshold amount of $4000 and not the current $5000
amount. See id.
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contract, lease, or appointment to any office or board. "Fundraiser means
an individual who directly solicits and secures contributions on behalf of
a candidate or slate of candidates for a statewide-elected state office
55146 These measures specifically address the concern that the
governor's office is "for sale" by reducing the number of no-bid contracts
awarded and appointments granted based on the influence exerted over
elected officials through campaign contributions. In theory, the quid pro
quo effect of special interest contributions and the awarding of no-bid
contracts should diminsh since special interests may not be repaid in the
form of state no-bid contracts and appointments. The strict sanctions
which accompany these provisions reinforce the seriousness the General
Assembly attaches to these matters. If an elected official knowingly
awards a no-bid contract in violation of the law, the penalty provisions
specify a felony conviction, which may also result in expulsion from
office. 147 The recipient of such no-bid contract also faces a felony
conviction and will be ineligible to receive no-bid contracts for five
years.
148
C. Soft Money and Independent Expenditures
In addition to bundling, the General Assembly also attempted to
address the soft money loophole. 49 In theory, soft money is for "non-
candidate-specific 'party building' activities such as getting out the
vote."'5 In reality, parties use soft money as a way to support specific
candidates without complying with campaign regulations or limita-
tions."' In Kentucky, political parties, corporations, individuals, and
other organizations can spend unlimited amounts on "soft-money" issues.
146 KY REV STAT. ANN. § 121.015(11) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1996).
147 See id. § 121.990(14) (providing for a Class D felony conviction). The
statute provides that "upon a final judicial determination of guilt, [an elected
official will] have is office declared vacant and shall forfeit all benefits which
he would have been entitled to receive had he continued to serve." Id.
148 See id. § 121.990(15) (providing for a Class D felony conviction).
149 See infra notes 153-60 and accompanying text. On the national level, the
major political parties spent $87.3 million in soft money in 1994. See CENTER
FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, supra note 8, at 15. Soft money reached
$207,002,834 by October 1996 for the election period. See COMMON CAUSE,
DEMOCRATIC & REPUBLICAN PARTY COMMITTEES RAISE RECORD $207 MILLION
IN SOFT MONEY THROUGH OCTOBER 16, at 1 (Press Release) (Oct. 30, 1996).
,50 See CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, supra note 8, at 15.
151 See id.
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In particular, Kentucky permits unlimited spending for issue advocacy by
political parties.'52 In order to prevent the circumvention of contribution
limits and the voluntary spending limits for public financing of the
governor's race, the General Assembly decided to treat inherently
coordinated expenditures by a party to elect its nominee or defeat the
nominee's opponent the same as contributions.'53 Therefore, a political
party could contribute only $500 in 1995 to a slate of candidates for
governor and lieutenant governor.'54
Currently, the only method to regulate soft money in Kentucky is a
$2500 per year limit on an individual's contributions to the state party
executive committee.'55 Other measures to combat soft money probably
will not emerge in light of the recent United States Supreme Court
decision in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v.
Federal Election Commission."56 In Colorado, the Court held that the
First Amendment gives party committees a right to spend unlimited
amounts of money, as long as the expenditures are not coordinated with
a particular candidate. In other words, the expenditure must be made
"independently, without coordination with any candidate."' 57 The Court
based its decision on evidence that money the Colorado Republican Party
spent on advertising was independent and without any understanding or
coordination with a particular candidate. "The independent expression of
a political party's views is 'core' First Amendment activity no less than
is the independent expression of individuals, candidates, or other political
committees."'5 8 Tis holding poses a tremendous problem for Kentucky
and other states with public financing.5 9 In other words, if Kentucky's
152 See id. at 23.
113 See KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 121A.050(3) (Miclue Supp. 1996).
'' In 1996 this amount was increased to $1000. See supra note 113 and
accompanying text.
, See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
156 Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996).
'
5 7 Id. at 2310.
158 Id. at 2316.
,51 Ten states provide for some form of public financing: Florida, Hawaii,
Kentucky, Maine, Miclgan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, Rhode Island,
and Wisconsin. See LOBBYING, PACs, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE, supra note 11,
at 251-52, 286, 427, 471, 540, 559, 638, 692, 854, 1073. Most recently in the
1996 election, voters in Maine passed an initiative that createda system of public
financing. See An Act to Reform Campaign Finance, Initiated Bill (Me. 1996)
(enacted by voter initiative).
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soft money limits are struck down, a political party could spend unlimited
amounts of money advocating the election of its slate or the defeat of the
opposing slate as long as the expenditures were not "coordinated" with
the particular candidate or slate. Tins would result in the state political
parties circumventing the contribution limits imposed on individuals and
PACs by spending unlimited amounts of money on generic advertising
supporting the party's message and slate of candidates. In essence, the
efforts to decrease the costs of the governor's race by providing for
public funding could become meaningless. 6 '
I1. GOVERNOR'S RACE IN KENTUCKY' PUBLIC FINANCING
Prior to 1992, the race for governor in Kentucky depended primarily
on who had the most money to spend. Tis resulted in the era of the
"millionaire" candidate.' 61 In the 1979, 1987, and 1991 governor's
races, millionaires won the office of governor in part by using their own
funds. The winner of the 1987 race, Wallace Wilkinson, spent over $7
million, greatly surpassing his opponents. 62 Moreover, Governors John
Y Brown, Jr. and Wallace Wilkinson loaned their campaigns a total of
$3.55 million from their own pockets, only to be repaid after the election
by contributors seeking no-bid contracts. 63 Issues of importance to the
public and discussions of the candidate's qualifications were forced into
the background as fundraising occupied the bulk of a candidate's and
campaign's time and energy Experience in the public sector did not seem
to matter any more considering that prior to being elected governor,
Brown and Wilkinson never held public office. The era of the "million-
160 Although public financing may suffer as a result of the decision reached
in Colorado, unlimited spending arguably strengthens apoliticalparty's influence
and loyalty, which benefits the overall democratic process. Weak political parties
result in a few powerful individuals controlling elections whereas a stronger party
provides an outlet for large numbers of individuals to participate. See Interview
with Carolyn Bratt, Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law,
in Lexington, Ky. (Nov. 1, 1996).
161 See supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
162 See Andrew Wolfson, Wilkinson Challenges Finance Law, COURIER-
JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 18, 1994, at Al, see also Robert T. Garrett,
Jones, Patton Closer to Getting Debts Repaid, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville,
Ky.), Nov 22, 1991, at B1 (discussing Jones' and Patton's loans).
163 See MILLER, supra note 92, at 219. Brown loaned his campaign $1.25
million in 1979. In 1987, Wilkinson surpassed tis amount by loamng Ins
campaign $2.3 million. See id. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
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aire" candidate persisted, culminating in the 1991 race when Brereton
Jones emerged as the winner and largest fundraiser, having spent $4
million."' 4
The enormous amount of spending deterred many qualified candidates
who did not have access to large sums of money 165 Former gubernato-
nal candidate Grady Stumbo argued that the substantial amount of money
one must raise to run for governor posed a disadvantage to the average
candidate who cannot compete. 66 Popular support did not matter if a
candidate could raise large sums of money The race for governor
transformed into one driven by money The whole idea of buying the
office of governor came to the forefront, however, because of
BOPTROT.67 According to Joe Terry, "BOPTROT was the event
which broke the straw in Kentucky leading to major support for campaign
finance reform.' 68
In 1990, the Kentucky Center for Public Issues and Leadership
Kentucky held town forums throughout the state to discuss campaign
finance reform. 69 The overwhelming response showed the public's
dissatisfaction with the huge role money played in Kentucky governor's
races, especially contributions from special interests.' Reform of the
governor's race became inevitable when the General Assembly met in
1992. The most controversial and significant part of the 1992 reform bill
concerned the partial public financing of the governor's race in Kentucky
The General Assembly adopted a plan modeled after public financing of
presidential elections upheld by the Umted States Supreme Court in
Buckley "' Kentucky is now one of a limited number of states which
'64 See Al Cross & Tom Loftus, House Approves Historic Campaign-Reform
Bill, COURMR-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Mar. 27, 1992, at Al.
165 See Terry, supra note 1, at 2.
166 See Loftus, Campaign Panel, supra note 112.
167 For further explanation, see supra note 91 and accompanying text.
161 Interview with Joe Terry, supra note 86.
169 See Terry, supra note 1, at 2.
170 See id.
171 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 97 See supra notes 43-67 and accompanying
text. The Buckley Court rejected the argument that public campaign financing
would effectively discriminate against new or minor party candidates. Tis
argument is based on the idea that established parties would receive sums larger
than those received by new or minor parties. The court reasoned that "the
Constitution does not require Congress to treat all declared candidates the same
for public financing purposes." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 97 If Congress did treat all
parties identically, it "'would not only make it easy to raid the United States
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publicly finance their gubematonal campaigns. 2 These public financ-
ing systems allow the candidates to voluntarily accept or reject the public
funds and accompanying spending limits.
The General Assembly passed the bill with the intent to decrease the
spiraling costs of campaigns in Kentucky and reduce the influence of
special interests that contribute large amounts in return for no-bid
contracts. 173 One of the most noticeable changes m the election process,
however, requires the governor and lieutenant governor to run as a slate
instead of as separate candidates. 74 When asked about this change,
Lieutenant Governor Stephen L. Henry replied, "the taxpayer benefits
from the fact that the candidates are required to run as a slate since less
money is being spent and more time is devoted to campaigning on the
issues rather than fundraising. ' Lieutenant Governor Henry also
pointed out that as a result of gubernatonal candidates being allowed to
pick their running mates, the office of the lieutenant governor is given a
Treasury, it would also artificially foster the proliferation of splinter parties.'"
Id. at 98 (quoting Buckley v Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
172 See supra note 159.
173 See supra Part II (notes 87-160 and accompanying text).
174 See KY REV STAT. ANN. § 118.127 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1996) ("A
slate of candidates for Governor and Lieutenant Governor shall list on the
notification and declaration the names of the candidates who shall jointly
appear on the ballot." Id. The statute further states that "[n]o candidate for
Governor or Lieutenant Governor shall appear individually on the ballot for the
nomination he is seeking." Id.). In the 1995 general election, the Democratic
candidates for governor and lieutenant governor were Paul Patton and Steve
Henry and the Republican candidates were Larry Forgy and Torn Handy. See Al
Cross, The Race for Governor; Patton Hits the Campaign Trail with Henry as
Slatemate, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 11, 1994, at Al.
In Gable v. Jones, No. 95-12 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 29, 1996) (unpublished
opinion) (on file with the United States District Court, Eastern Distnct of
Kentucky in Frankfort, Ky.), the court granted defendant's motion for judgment
as a matter of law regarding Bob Gable's challenge to the requirement of a slate
as an infringementupon his "First Amendmentnght to freepolitical association."
Id. at 2. The court held that the state has a compelling interest to prevent
factionalism m state government and to stabilize the government. Therefore, the
court determined that the requirement that candidates for governor and lieutenant
governor run as a slate is a "reasonable, nondiscriminatory, and virtually
unobtrusive restriction[ ] on Gable's right to access the gubernatonal ballot." Id.
at3.
171 Interview with Lieutenant Governor Stephen L. Henry, in Frankfort, Ky.
(Nov 12, 1996).
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more functional and productive role in the administration, which benefits
all Kentuckians.'76
Once a candidate for governor chooses a running mate, the slate must
file a joint notification and declaration with the Secretary of State. 177
Then, the slate must register with the Registry and file a statement of
intent to either accept or reject public financing. 7 ' In order to be
eligible for matching funds, a slate must raise at least $300,000.1' The
law also requires a slate seeking public financing to have opposition, and
at least one opposing slate must 'aise the threshold amount. Once the
slate raises the threshold amount, il may accept matching funds from the
state at a rate of $2 of public fumds for each $1 raised by the slate.80
Under this system a slate may raise no more than $600,00.8' In other
words, a slate may receive a totdl of $1.2 million from the Election
Campaign Fund for a total of $1.8ftillion in each election. The law set
the spending limit at $1.8 million, far below the $4 million expended by
Brereton Jones, the winner of the 1991 race. Lieutenant Governor Henry
believes the $1.8 million was sufficient to run an effective, issue-oriented
campaign in 1995. However, he does believe that the numbers should be
adjusted before the next race to reflect inflation. ' 2
The contribution limits apply to slates as well. Each individual and
PAC may give up to $1000 to a slate per election.8 3 However, of the
total amount a slate may spend, only twenty-five percent or $150,000
may come from PACs8 4 and no more than fifty percent may come
from contributors in a single congressional district. 85 Following the
ruling in Buckley,'86 members of a slate may contribute unlimited
amounts to their campaigns, but only $500 will qualify as eligible for
176 See id.
117 See Ky. REV STAT. ANN. § 118.165 (Miclue 1993 & Supp. 1996).
178 See id. § 121A.040. See generally McBrayer & Young, supra note 115,
at 422-27 (providing a brief overview of Kentucky campaign finance).
179 See Ky. REv STAT. ANN. § 121A.060(1) (Micle 1993 & Supp. 1996).
The maximum threshold is $600,000. See id.
180 See id. § 121A.060(3)(c).
181 See id. § 121A.060(l).
182 See Interview with Lieutenant Governor Stephen L. Henry, supra note
175.
183 See Ky REv STAT. ANN. §§ 121.150(6), 121A.050(l) (Michie Supp.
1996).
184 See id. § 121A.050(4).
185 See id. § 121A.060(1).
186 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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matching funds.' The $1.8 million cap, however, includes all contribu-
tions and expenditures, regardless of the source of the funds. 88 The law
also imposes a limit of $50,000 on the amount a candidate may loan to
his or her campaign. Any amount over $50,000 will be deemed a
contribution and, thus, a candidate cannot be repaid once elected.'89 For
example, if a candidate contributes $75,000 to his or her campaign, only
$500 will qualify for matching funds from the state and $50,000 will
qualify as a loan; however, the entire $75,000 will count toward the
maximum limit of $1.8 million.
In order to momtor the process and ensure that slates do not exceed
the maximum expenditure limits, the General Assembly increased the
reporting requirements. Slates must provide monthly reports to the
Registry and report every fourteen days during the fifty-six days
preceding an election. 9 ' The reforms also strengthened the penalties in
order to make the law more effective and to increase the seriousness
attached to the law The new penalties consist of not only civil penal-
ties, 9 ' but also criminal sanctions for knowing violations of the
law 192 Also, elected officials are subject to forfeiture of office and all
benefits for such violations. 9
3
The law also considers situations in which slates choose not to
participate m the public financing program. The most controversial
provision' 94 is commonly referred to as the "trigger provision."'9 s
187 See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
188 See Terry, supra note 1, at 3.
189 See Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F Supp. 916, 930 (W.D. Ky. 1995)
(discussing KY. REv STAT. ANN. § 121.150(13) & (20) (Michie 1993 & Supp.
1996)).
190 See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
'9' See KY REv STAT. ANN. § 121.140 (Miche 1993 & Supp. 1996)
(providing for the Registry to assess penalties against violators of campaign
finance law if the Registry concludes that there is probable cause to believe that
the law has been violated). The penalties cannot exceed $100 a day to a
maximum fine of $5000. See id. Injunctive reliefmay also be sought. See zd., see
also id. § 121.990(5).
192 See id. at § 121.990 (providing for Class D felony convictions if there is
a knowing violation of the campaign finance laws).
"9 See id. Various violations of the campaign finance laws result in the
officer having his office declared vacant and a forfeiture of any benefits he
would have received in office. Forfeiture occurs when there is a final judicial
determination of guilt. See id., see also Terry, supra note 1, at 3.
194 See KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 121A.030(5)(a) (Miche Supp. 1996).
' See Wilkinson v Jones, 876 F Supp. 916, 926 (W.D. Ky. 1995).
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Once a nonparticipating slate exceeds the $1.8 million cap, the law
releases a participating slate from the spending limit and allows it to
spend more than $1.8 million and still receive state matching funds. 196
In effect, the provision provides an incentive for all candidates to agree
to the voluntary spending limit of $1.8 million in order to receive state
funds. Due to the fact that both major candidates in the 1995 governor's
race accepted public funding the trigger provision has never taken effect
m Kentucky Another provision,'97 later held to be of dubious validi-
ty,19 limited contributions to $500 to participating slates whereas
nonparticipating slates could only accept contributions of $100 or less
from individuals and PACs. The General Assembly intended the "trigger
provision" and the difference in contribution limits to encourage all
candidates to participate m the public funding in order to "combat corrupt
influences and promote 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate on
public issues."'9 9 As expected, these provisions along with the entire
concept of public financing prompted several constitutional challenges to
the law
96 See id. (discussing KY. REV STAT. ANN. §§ 121A.080(4), (5) &
121A.060(2)(c) (Miehle 1993) (subsequentlyamended, seeKY. REv STAT. ANN.
§§ 121A.080(4), (5) and 121A.060(2)); see also Terry, supra note 1, at 3.
'9' See KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 121A.050(2) (Michie 1993). Section
121A.050 was amended in 1996. See 1996 Ky. Acts 307 The 1996 version
significantly differs from the 1992 version. The amended version no longer
contains the "cap gap" provision which limited contributions to $100 for
nonparticipating slates but allowed a maximum of $500 for contributions to
participating slates. The amended version now limits contributions to any slate
of candidates, participating or not, to $1000. See KY. REV STAT. ANN. §
121A.050(l)-(2) (Michie Supp. 1996).
19' See Willanson, 876 F Supp. at 929. Potential gubernatorial candidate
Wallace Wilkinson brought a federal constitutional challenge to enjoin certain
provisions of Kentucky's election finance laws, including the "cap gap"
provision. The court found the disparity in permissible contributions between
privately-financed and publicly-financed candidates unconstitutional. Privately-
financed candidates could only receive $100 per person whereas publicly-
financed candidates could receive $500 per person. The court determined that the
"cap gap," id. at 927, is not narrowly tailored to meet the compelling government
interest of "thwarting quid pro quo corruption." Id. at 929. The court reasoned
that the five to one disparity is "palpably penal" because a privately-financed
candidate would have to reach so many more supporters. See id.
'99 Id. at 926 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964)).
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IV CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
TO KENTUCKY CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW
Since the General Assembly passed the campaign finance reform
package in 1992 and the amendments m 1994, four major suits were filed
to challenge particular provisions of the laws. This Part examines each of
these cases and the probability that the challenged provisions will be
upheld based on federal case law and case law from Kentucky and other
jurisdictions. The analysis is restricted to the claims concerning the public
financing of the governor's race. Each of the following cases involves a
challenge to restrictions on content-based speech imposed by the
campaign finance laws. In order to meet strict scrutiny for First Amend-
ment claims, the provision which restricts content-based speech must be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest."' The United
States Supreme Court and Kentucky courts have ruled that the govern-
ment interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption
is compelling;20 ' therefore, the only remaining question is whether each
challenged provision is narrowly tailored to meet the compelling
governmental interest.
A. Wilkinson v Jones
In 1994, former governor and potential 1995 gubernatorial candidate
Wallace Wilkinson filed suit to enjoin enforcement of several provisions
of the Public Financing Campaign Act as unconstitutional violations of
freedom of speech.2"2 Wilkinson is a leading opponent of the plan and
200 See infra Part IV.A.-D (notes 202-67 and accompanying text).
20, See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
202 See Wilkinson v Jones, 876 F Supp. 916 (W.D. Ky. 1995). Besides the
provisions discussed in this Note, Wilkinson challengedthe disclaimerprovision,
see KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 121.190(1) (Micle 1993) (subsequently amended,
see KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 121.190(1) (Micle Supp. 1996)), and the
prohibition on exploratory polling, see id. § 121.150(1) (Michie 1993)
(subsequently amended, see KY. REv STAT. ANN. § 121.150(1) (Miclhe Supp.
1996)), and § 121.175(1) (Michie Supp. 1996). See Wilkinson, 876 F Supp. at
921. The court upheld the disclaimer provision. See id. at 932. However, the
court relied on the decision reached in Bunning v. Kentucky, 42 F.3d 1008 (6th
Cir. 1994), when it accepted the stipulation that the plaintiffs would likely
succeed on the merits regarding the exploratory polling prohibition. See
Wilkinson, 876 F Supp. at 922; see also Bunning, 42 F.3d at 1008. Bunning
arose out of the Registry's attempt to investigate a poll conducted by Congress-
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one of the most successful fundraisers in gubernatorial campaigns.
Wilkinson objects to the entire notion of public financing and argues that
the plan limits freedom of speech rights and penalizes nonparticipating
slates.0 3 In 1987, Wilkinson spent over $4 million in his campaign to
win the governor's office; $3.2 million of that amount was Wilkinson's
own money he loaned to the campaign. 204 After the election, Wilkinson
spent a great deal of time raising money to reimburse himself for the
loans he made to the campaign. When the General Assembly passed the
1992 reform package, Wilkinson's fundraising tactics and loan repay-
ments provided much of the incentive for the passage of several
provisions. °5 Wilkinson's suit stemmed from his belief that public
funding conditional upon the acceptance of expenditure limits violates the
U.S. Constitution. This is simply not the case.
Wilkinson's challenge parallels an unsuccessful attack on public
financing of presidential elections. Relying on the Supreme Court's
decision m Buckley, °6 the court in Republican National Committee v.
Federal Election Commission20 1 upheld the constitutionality of the
Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act.20 The court determined that
Congress has the power under the General Welfare Clause to set
man Jim Bunmng's re-election committee testing the effectiveness of his 1992
campaign advertising. The Registry claimed that Bunnmg may have used the poll
to assess his potential as a future gubernatorial candidate, and Kentucky law
prohibits such exploratory activity. Bunnmg claimed that federal law pre-empts
state law and, therefore, the Registry was precluded from investigating. The court
concluded that the Federal Election Campaign Act pre-empted Kentucky law on
the facts of this case, and enjoined the Registry from taking further action with
respect to the poll. See id. at 1012. In 1996, the General Assembly passed House
Bill 135 which added a new section to chapter 121A of Kentucky Revised
Statutes allowing slates to have exploratory committees. See 1996 Ky. Acts 482.
203 See Mark R. Chellgren, Wilkinson Says He Won't Run Again If New
Campaign Law Isn't Nullified, HERALD-LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), Nov. 18,
1994, at Al.
204 See Loftus, Big-Money, supra note 3.
205 See id; see also Terry, supra note 1, at 2 ("[w]ith public opinion
galvanedby the press coupled with the anti-Wilknson sentiment, the 1992
General Assembly enactedsweeping reforms"). Terry points out that Wilkimson's
fundraising techniques were no worse than those of his predecessors. See 1d.
206 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
207 Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 487 F Supp. 280,
284 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
208 Presidential Campaign Fund Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-109, 80 Stat.
1587 (current version at 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9013 (1994)).
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voluntary expenditure limits as a condition for the acceptance of public
funding by a presidential candidate. The court also pointed out that the
law is not an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment as long
as candidates remain free to choose whether to accept public funding, and
if they reject, their ability to raise unlimited amounts of money is
unfettered. "Nothing prevents candidates from seeking private, instead of
public, funding. The First Amendment is not implicated where candidates
remain free to choose between funding alternatives."209 The Kentucky
law meets this standard by allowing a slate of candidates to file a
statement of acceptance or rejection with the Registry 210 If a slate
rejects public financing, the slate may raise as much money as possible
subject to the limitations imposed on individual and PAC contribu-
tions.21l
Wilkinson took the argument one step farther and asserted that, even
if public financing with voluntary expenditure limits is constitutional, the
Kentucky law serves to penalize nonparticipating slates in two major
ways: the trigger provision21 2 and the disparity between contribution
limits for participating and nonparticipating slates.213 Judge Charles
Simpson for the Western District of Kentucky refused to enjoin the
"trigger provision," which operates to release publicly-funded candidates
from the voluntary spending limit if a privately-funded candidate exceeds
the $1.8 million amount.214 Wilkinson had asserted that the trigger
209 Weber v Heaney, 793 F Supp. 1438, 1457 (D. Minn. 1992) (upholding
the Minnesota Congressional Campaign Reform Act conditioning public funding
upon candidates' voluntary agreement to abide by expenditure limitations did not
violate First Amendment), aff'd, 995 F.2d 872 (8th Cir. 1993).
210 See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
211 See supra notes 177-87 and accompanying text. For a general summary,
see Wilkinson, 876 F Supp. at 920-21.
212 See Wilkinson, 876 F Supp. at 926 (discussing KY. REV STAT. ANN. §
121A.030(5) (Micue 1993) (subsequently amended, see KY REV STAT. ANN.
§ 121A.030(5) (Micue Supp. 1996)).
213 See id. at 928 (discussing KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 121A.050(1)-(2)
(Michie 1993) (subsequently amended)). See supra note 197 (describing
amendment).
214 See Wilkinson, 876 F Supp. at 926. See generally Fred Werthemier &
Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restorng the Health
of Our Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REV 1126, 1150-51 (1994) (supporting
"trigger provisions" as a necessary component to ensure that public funding
remains a "viable option"). But see Joseph E. Finley, Comment, The Pitfalls of
Contingent Public Financing in Congressional Campaign Spending Reform, 44
[Vol. 85754
1996-97] CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM IN KENTUCKY
provision places a burden on nonparticipating slates because it "chills"
their speech as they approach the $1.8 million cap for fear that additional
fundraising on their part will allow the participating slates to receive state
funds above the limit.215 However, the trigger provision allows partici-
pating slates to raise additional funds only if they choose to do so.
Without the trigger provision, participating slates run the risk of being
outspent by candidates financed entirely by private funds. In order to
satisfy the state's interest m preventing corruption of the governor's
office m Kentucky and in preventing the quid pro quo effect of large
contributions, the trigger provision must remain intact so as to provide an
incentive to candidates to accept public funding.21 6 At the same tine,
the law must grant the freedom to those who reject public funding to
raise as much money as they wish. Judge Simpson reasoned that the
General Assembly narrowly tailored the provision to meet the compelling
state interest to "combat corruption and the appearance of corruption in
the Kentucky electoral process." '217
However, the court was more sympathetic to the arguments challeng-
ing the different contribution limits for participating and nonparticipating
candidates. As an additional incentive to accept public funding, the
General Assembly had limited contributions to $100 or less for nonpartic-
ipating slates whereas participating slates could accept contributions up
to $500.2"' Although courts have upheld such "cap gaps" as constitu-
tional,2 19 Judge Simpson explained that the $100 limit is so low so as
to burden a nonparticipating candidate. 0 The Registry later conceded
EMORY L.J. 735 (1995) (providing a detailed analysis of the penalizing effects
of "trigger provisions" on nonparticipating candidates).
215 See Wilknson, 876 F Supp. at 927
216 See id. at 928.
217 Id. at 926 (interest as it is defined by the government). For other states
with "trigger provisions," see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106.355 (West 1992) and R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 17-25-24 (1996).
218 See KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 121A.050(2) (Michie 1993). This provision
has since been amended. See supra note 147
219 See Willanson, 876 F Supp. at 928-29 ("As a general proposition then,
a 'cap gap' is permissible in theory as a weapon against quid pro quo
corruption A cap gap is permissible in practice only if it is narrowly
tailored to meet that compelling state interest.").
220 The court, m Wilknson, indicated at the outset of its discussion of tis
disparity that "here is a substantial likelihood that the plaintiffs will succeed on
the merits of their claims challenging the constitutionality of the $100 contribu-
tion cap imposed upon pnvately-financedcandidates."Id at 928. The court thus
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that this provision constituted a penalty and therefore, the provision will
not be enforced.22'
Wilkinson also challenged the limit of $50,000 that a candidate could
loan his campaign.222 Once a candidate gives his campaign more than
$50,000, it is deemed to be a contribution and the candidate may not seek
reimbursement after the election. 223 Had this provision been in effect
during the 1987 election, Wilkinson would have been financially injured
because, after the election, he recouped a major part of the money he
loaned his campaign.224 Judge Simpson found that the limit was nar-
rowly tailored to meet the compelling state interest of decreasing the
appearance of corruption and preventing the quid pro quo of campaign
loan paybacks. Judge Simpson reasoned that a candidate not heavily
indebted to the campaign avoids the appearance of being "personally
financially vulnerable 25 and therefore avoids the appearance of
agreed that "the $100 limit is so low as to constitute a penalty for rejecting
public financing." Id. However, the court also considered a somewhat separate
issue: the disparity between the contributions privately-funded candidates can
accept and the contributions publicly-funded candidates can accept. See id., see
also Day v Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1365 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that $100
contribution limit was simply too low and could severely restrict political
expression by making it difficult for candidates to raise the necessary funds),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 936 (1995). But see Vote Choice, Inc. v DiStefano, 4
F.3d 26, 38-39 (1st Cir. 1993) (upholding Rhode Island's campaign finance law
containing a cap gap whereby participating candidates may receive contributions
up to $2000 and nonparticipating candidates are limited to $1000 because the cap
gap is not burdensome or coercive since the candidate is given a choice whether
to accept public funds).
221 In Galbraith v. Gorman, GatewoodGalbraith, a 1995 Democraticprnmary
gubernatorial candidate, challengedthree provisions of the campaign finance law,
including the contribution limitation of $100 on nonparticipating slates. The court
enjoined enforcement of the $100 limit and upheld the provisions regarding
limits on cash and anonymous contributions. See Galbraith v. Gorman, No.
94-CI-1731 (Franklin Cir. Ct., Feb. 6, 1995) (unpublished opinion), cited in
Appellee's Brief at 2, Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v Terry, No. 95-6581, 1997
WL 96900 (6th Cir. Mar. 7, 1997).
222 See KY REV STAT. ANN. § 121.150(13), (20) (Michie 1993 & Supp.
1996).
223 See id.
224 See Richard Whitt, Session Made Mark with Election Reform, COURIER-
JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Apr. 10, 1988, at Al.
225 Wilkinson, 876 F Supp. at 930.
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corruption.226 The court also found that $50,000 was not too low as to
"chill a candidate's early and loud speech." '227 Furthermore, a candi-
date's freedom to spend unlimited amounts is not hindered by the
$50,000 loan limit. The limit only restricts the repayment of money to a
candidate, not the contribution of money by a candidate. On the whole,
the outcome of Wilkinson's suit reinforced the strength of the Public
Financing Campaign Act because the court found that the most crucial
provisions of the Act met constitutional standards.
B. Gable v Jones
Another strong opponent of public financing for the governor's race
m Kentucky is Bob Gable, former chair of the Republican Party of
Kentucky and gubernatorial candidate in the 1995 Republican primary
election.22 In 1995, Gable challenged the constitutionality of several
provisions of Kentucky's campaign finance reform law229 Gable's
major challenges concerned the public financing of the gubernatorial race,
and in particular, the prohibition against receiving contributions thirty
days before either the primary or general election and fourteen days
before a runoff election, the "trigger provision," and the limit of $50,000
a candidate may loan a campaign.21' Gable asserted that these provi-
sions impose unconstitutional burdens because they-
226 See id.
227 Id. at 931.
228 See David Royse, Alexander Is Top Fund-Raiser in State, COURIER-
JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Mar. 11, 1996, at B4.
229 See Gable v. Jones, No. 95-12 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 29, 1996) (unpublished
opinion) (on file with the United States District Court, Eastern District of
Kentucky in Frankfort, Ky.). In hIs original complaint Gable listed 22 claims.
The 11 claims alleged by the other plaintiff, Darryl Sebastian, were dismissed.
Only three claims apply to the analysis at hand. The other claims concern the
constitutionality of requing candidates for governor and lieutenant governor to
run as a slate, see KY. REv STAT. ANN. §§ 118.125,.127 (1993 & Supp. 1996);
the definition of independent expenditure, see id. § 121.150(1); the prohibition
of charitable contributions by PACs, see id. § 121.150(2); the disclaimer
provision, see id. § 121.190(1); the prohibition of vote buying, see id. §§
121.045, .055; and the penalties, see id. § 121.990.
210 See Gable, No. 95-12, at 4-5, 12-13. In 1996, the General Assembly
amended section 121A.030(5) from thirty days to twenty-eight days preceding
a primary or general election. See 1996 Ky. Acts 468. For purposes of analysis
in Gable, the thirty day restriction will be used.
1996-97]
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(1) prohibit him from contributing to his own, or any campaign, m the
tlrty days prior to a primary or general election; (2) use his spending
as a "trigger" for lifting the spending cap on participating slates; and (3)
use his spending as a trigger for making additional public funds
available for the participating slates.231
First, the court granted Gable's motion for summary judgment
regarding the claim that the thirty day time restriction was an unconstitu-
tional burden on Gable.2 32 The court reached this decision by relying
on and distinguishing Buckley v. Valeo.233 In Buckley, the Court held
that the government may not restrict personal expenditures by candidates
on their own behalf. "[I]t is of particular Importance that candidates have
the unfettered opportunity to make their views known so that the
electorate may intelligently evaluate the candidates' personal qualities and
their positions on vital public issues before choosing among them on
election day 2 34 In order to comply with Buckley, Kentucky's laws do
not restrict the amount a candidate can spend in his or her campaign.
Instead, the laws "prohibit candidates from contributing to their own
campaigns during the reporting period." '235 The reporting period is thirty
days before a primary or general election and fourteen days before a
run-off election. The Court in Buckley did not determine whether a timing
restriction violates a candidate's constitutional rights. 23 6 In Gable, the
court relied on Supreme Court decisions which allow the government to
regulate the time, place, and manner of speech activities if such regula-
tions are reasonable, nondiscriminatory, and serve "an inportant
governmental interest unrelated to the restriction of commumcation." 37
The state argued that the time period restriction was not an undue burden
considering the government's interest in preventing corruption and the
appearance of corruption. Furthermore, the General Assembly intended
to prevent candidates from pouring large sums of money into the
campaign at the last minute. According to the state, the reporting period
ensured the enforceability of the entire campaign financing system by
23 Gable, No. 95-12, at 5.
232 See id. at 8.
233 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). See supra notes 43-67
234 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 52-53.
235 Gable, No. 95-12, at 5.
236 See id.
237 Id. at 6; see Erznoznik v City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975);
Adderleyv Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Cox v Louisana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965);
Kovacs v Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
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granting the Registry time to determine whether a slate has exceeded the
$1.8 million cap. The court held that the government interest was not
compelling as applied to a candidate's own expenditures and, therefore,
the provision limiting candidate contributions during the final days of a
campaign unconstitutionally restricted a candidate's right to free political
expression."' Thus, the prohibition against receiving contributions in
the last thirty days prior to the election does not apply to funds contribut-
ed by the candidate, but only to contributions from other sources."3 9
Second, Gable challenged the constitutionality of the trigger
provision.240 The trigger provision means that once a nonparticipating
slate exceeds the $1.8 million expenditure cap imposed on participating
slates, the state releases the participating slate from the cap. The court
held that tlus provision does not burden Gable's right to political speech.
By choosing not to participate in the public financing plan, a candidate
can still raise unlimited amounts of funds for his/her campaign. Further-
more, the court ruled that Gable's argument that the provision is
unconstitutionally coercive of nonparticipating slates was without merit.
Granted, the court explained, the provision would "chill" speech to some
extent because once a nonparticipating slate exceeds the $1.8 million cap,
any spending over that amount would allow a participating slate to raise
additional funds and be eligible for matching funds from the state.
However, the court pointed out that the statute does not force a candidate
to accept public funding.24 ' The court concluded that Kentucky's plan
met the guidelines set forth in Buckley by allowing slates to choose
whether to accept public financing.242 According to the court, the
trigger provision provided an incentive for candidates to accept public
financing and thereby agree to an overall limit on expenditures,243 and
the public financing law served a compelling government interest in
preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption by controlling the
spiraling costs of the governor's race in Kentucky Moreover, the benefit-
equals-burden argument failed for the simple reason that a benefit to a
238 See Gable, No. 95-12, at 8. In Buckley, the Court determined that the
government interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption
does not support the limitation on a candidate's expenditures of ins own personal
funds. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 53.
239 See Gable, No. 95-12, at 8.
240 See id. at 4. For a discussion of KY. REV STAT. ANN. 121A.030(5)(a),
the "trigger provisions," see supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
241 See Gable, No. 95-12, at 10-12.
242 See Id. at 9-12.
243 See id. at 11.
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participating slate does not ipso facto constitute a burden on another
candidate's rights.2' The court held that Gable did not articulate a
reason why the trigger provision itself imposed a coercive burden on a
nonparticipating slate and therefore, the court granted judgment as a
matter of law for the state.245
Gable also challenged the provisions that prohibit a slate of candi-
dates from loaning the campaign in excess of $50,000 per election.246
Any amount over $50,000 is deemed to be a contribution to the campaign
and is not recoverable. The purpose of this provision was to prevent the
quid pro quo effect which occurred when candidates loaned millions to
their campaign only to be repaid after election, usually by businesses
seeking no-bid contracts in the state. 247 Gable challenged the constitu-
tionality of tins provision as a content based restriction on his right to
free political speech. Relying on Kentucky's history of governors
receiving contributions after election to repay their debts in exchange for
"favors, 248 the court determined that the statutes were narrowly tailored
to meet the government interest of preventing corruption and restoring
integrity to the democratic process. 249
C. Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v Terry
In Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry,250 Kentucky Right to Life,
in its capacity as a PAC ("KRLPAC"), brought suit challenging several
provisions of Kentucky's campaign finance law,25 including the
244 See id. at 9; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 95; Vote Choice, Inc. v
DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 38 (1st Cir. 1993); Weber v. Heaney, 793 F Supp. 1438,
1457 (D. Minn. 1992); Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n,
487 F Supp. 280, 285 (S.D.N.Y 1980).
245 See Gable, No. 95-12, at 12.
246 See KY REv STAT. ANN. § 121.150(13), (20) (Michie 1993 & Supp.
1996).
247 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
248 Gable, No. 95-12, at 13; see also Wilkinson v Jones, 876 F Supp. 916
(W.D. Ky. 1995).
.249 See Gable, No. 95-12, at 13.
250 Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v Terry, No. 95-6581, 1997 WL 96900 (6th
Cir. Mar. 7, 1997).
251 See id. at *1. In addition to the claim challenging public financing, the
plaintiffs challenged provisions including the definitions of "contribution" and
"permanent committee," see KY. REv STAT. ANN. § 121.015(3)(c) & (6)(e) and
§ 121A.010(9)(c) & (11); the disclaimer requirement, see d. § 121.190(1); the
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provision preventing slates of candidates for governor and lieutenant
governor from receiving PAC contributions in excess of $150,000 for
nonparticipating slates or twenty-five percent of total contributions for
participating slates. KRLPAC argued that tis mfringed on its freedom of
speech rights by prohibiting it from contributing to a candidate who had
already received the maximum PAC contribution. The court did not
accept KRLPAC's argument that the provision imposed an unconstitution-
al burden. Instead, the court reasoned that since participating slates may
accept a maximum of $600,000 m contributions, only one hundred fifty
PACs may contribute the maximum $1000. Assuming that all one
hundred fifty PACs contributed the maximum, the provision would apply
to the one hundred fifty-first PAC that sought to contribute. Thus, the
court held that the provision imposes a "minimal speech restriction upon"
PACs and was narrowly tailored to meet the compelling government
interest of "combatting perceived corruption." '252 Tis decision illus-
trates the seriousness with which the courts view reforming campaigns in
Kentucky and the extent to which the law in Kentucky remains viable.
D. Democratic Party of Kentucky v Kentucky Registry of Election
Finance
In August 1996, the Democratic Party of Kentucky, Robert A.
Babbage, and Terry McBrayer 53 filed suit against the Registry chal-
lenging the provision governing independent and coordinated expendi-
tures 4 under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
limit on PAC contributions, see id. §§ 121.150(6), 121A.050(1); the aggregate
amount an individual may contribute to a PAC, see id. § 121.150(10); and the
adminstrative fee imposed on PACs, see id. § 121.180(6)(b). See KentuckyRight
to Life, 1997 WL 96900, at *2-3.
The trial court had ruled in favor of the plaintiffs regarding KY REv STAT.
ANN. § 121.180(6), which requires all PACs to pay an administrative fee to the
Registry equal to 5% of all contributions. See Gable, No. 95-12, at 13. The trial
court held that the fee was a tax and constituted a restriction on political speech
failing to meet strict constitutional scrutiny. See id. at 13-15.
252 Kentucky Right to Life, 1997 WL 96900, at *11.
13 Bob Babbage is the current chair of the Kentucky Democratic Party and
Terry McBrayer served as party chair during the 1995 elections. See House
Candidate Charged in Theft Should Withdraw His Party Chairman Says,
COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Oct. 26, 1996, at B2.
254 See KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 121.150(1).
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States Constitution.211 The suit arose from accusations by the Republi-
can Party of Kentucky that the Democrats exceeded the $1.8 million cap
by knowingly accepting contributions and classifying them as independent
rather than coordinated expenses for the governor's race in violation of
provision.256
Although the General Assembly amended the definition of indepen-
dent expenditures in March 1996,257 the plaintiffs alleged that the
definition in effect dunng the 1995 elections was so broad and vague as
to deprive any person of notice of what constituted an independent
expenditure, therefore violating the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Constitution. The statute in question provides:
No contribution of money or other thing of value, nor obligation
therefor, shall be made or received, and no expenditure of money or
other thing of value shall be made or incurred, directly or indirectly,
other than an "independent expenditure," to support or defeat a
candidate, slate of candidates "[I]ndependent expenditure" means
one made for a communication which expressly advocates the election
or defeat of a clearly identified candidate or slate of candidates and
which is not made with any direct or indirect cooperation, consent,
request, suggestion, or consultation involving a candidate, slate of
candidates 258
255 See Democratic Party of Ky. v. Kentucky Registry of Election Fin., No.
96-80 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 6, 1996) (defendant's motion to hold action in abeyance)
(on file with the United States District Court, Eastern District of Kentucky in
Frankfort, Ky.).
256 See KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 121.150(1) (Michie 1993) (subsequently
amended, see KY REv STAT. ANN. § 121.150(1) (Michie Supp. 1996)).
257 See infra note 258.
258 KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 121.150(1) (Miclue 1993). The General
Assembly amended this statute in 1996. See 1996 Ky. Acts 468. The 1996
version no longer contains the definition of "independent expenditure." It states
that no contribution, other than an independent expenditure, shall be made or
received to support or defeat a candidate or slate of candidates except through
the duly appointed campaign manager or campaign treasurer. See KY. REV
STAT. ANN. § 121.150(1) (Michie Supp. 1996). The definition of "independent
expenditure" is now found in KY. REv STAT. ANN. § 121.015(12) (Michie Supp.
1996) which states that independent expenditure "means the expenditure of
money or other things of value for a communication which expressly advocates
the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate and which is made
without any coordination, consultation, or cooperation with any candidate
Id.
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In explaining the logic behind the suit, McBrayer stated, "the entire
time during the election one is worried about whether an expenditure by
someone in Bowling Green may be later defined as a coordinated
expenditure rather than independent and then it will count against the
$1.8 million [cap]. '259 The plaintiffs clained that the law does not draw
a line between what could be classified as an independent expenditure as
opposed to a coordinated expenditure. In the 1995 gubernatorial race,
both parties faced major dilemmas in classifying the expenditures in order
to make sure the slates did not exceed the $1.8 million cap.
The likelihood of success in this challenge does not look promising
given that the Gable court held that the definition of independent
expenditure was "not so vague as to restrict free political speech. '260 On
the other hand, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Colorado
Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commis-
sion261 that a political party can make independent expenditures 262 and
a state may not restrict a political party's independent expenditures.263
If the Colorado holding causes Kentucky's independent and coordinated
expenditure provision to fail, it could destroy public financing by
allowing political parties to spend unlimited amounts regardless of the
spending cap.
The Democratic Party suit also challenged the definition of "know-
ingly" which includes conduct or circumstances a "person is aware of or
should have been aware exists."'2 McBrayer argued that a candi-
date can not control what an independent group or individual does for the
campaign and therefore, a candidate should not be held in violation for
acts he or she "should have been aware" existed. Considering the strict
259 Interview with Terry McBrayer, former chair of the Kentucky Democratic
Party and an attorney in Lexington, Ky., in Lexington, Ky. (Nov 5, 1996).
260 Gable v Jones, No. 95-12, at 15 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 29, 1996).
261 Colorado RepublicanFed. CampaignComm. v. FederalElectionComm'n,
116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996).262 See id. at 2318.
263 See id. at 2317 During his re-election campaign a Democratic congress-
man was the subject of Colorado Republican Party radio advertisement attacks.
The FEC alleged that the advertising expenditures violated the coordinated
expenditure limit. The Court concluded that no presumption exists that political
party expenditures are coordinated with a candidate's campaign. See id. at 2318.
Therefore, since there was no factual proof that the Colorado Party's expendi-
tures were coordinated, the FEC could not constitutionally regulate independent
expenditures. See id. at 2315.
264 KY. REv STAT. ANN. § 121.015(10) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1996).
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penalties,265 McBrayer argued the defimtion violates the Due Process
Clause.
66
As of March 1996, both parties had agreed to suspend all proceedings
in the action until further motion by either party Although the courts will
not have an opportunity any time soon to rule upon these issues, the
problem of independent expenditures is one that faces every campaign in
the country In Colorado, the Court held that a true independent
expenditure may not be limited by the government for any reason.267
Independent expenditures reach into the depths of the First Amendment.
However, something must be done to control the unlimited spending by
political parties or else the purpose of public financing will be destroyed.
CONCLUSION
The 1995 Kentucky governor's race partially funded by public money
differed tremendously from the previous races in which "millionaire"
candidates dominated. By focusing on the issues and participating in
numerous debates and joint appearances, the candidates proved that the
race for governor may be won without the outrageous fundraising tactics
witnessed in the past. Public financing opens the door for qualified
candidates to participate in the electoral process without worrying about
raising several million dollars. Furthermore, public financing allows the
candidates to spend more time on grass-roots campaigning rather than
fundrmsmg. Discussions of the issues and a race consisting of two viable
candidates on equal financial footing resulted in a record voter turn-
out.268 Furthermore, due to the decrease in contribution limits and the
aggregate amount a candidate may receive from PACs, there is no
suspicion that Governor Patton and Lieutenant Governor Henry are in
debt to special interests. Finally, Kentuckians may rest assured that the
"for sale" sign has been removed from the office of the governor.
Overall, public financing proved a success; however, the General
Assembly needs to assess a few problems. First, there exists a serious
threat to the voluntary expenditure limits. By allowing political parties to
spend unlimited amounts of money for issue advocacy, the purpose of
265 See supra notes 191-93.
266 See Democratic Party of Ky. v. Kentucky Registry of Election Fin., No.
96-80 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 6, 1996).
267 Colorado, 116 S. Ct. at 2309.
268 See Snyder, supra note 14 (discussing the fact that the 1995 governor's
race was the third largest voter turnout in Kentucky history).
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public financing will be thwarted. The Supreme Court's decision in
Colorado forces the General Assembly to address party spending in order
to secure the effectiveness of public funding. One way to do so would be
to decrease the amount one can contribute to a party from $1500 to
possibly $1000 or $500. Tius would curtail the overall amount a party
could spend. Second, m order to nurture a two-party system in the state,
the provision requiring a candidate to have an opponent m the primary
must be invalidated. In 1995, Larry Forgy, the Republican candidate for
governor, was ineligible for public funds in the primary because he did
not have a viable opponent. Even though Forgy was allowed to raise over
the $600,000 maximum amount for participating candidates, then-
candidates Governor Patton and Lieutenant Governor Henry were eligible
for public funds since they did have opponents in the Democratic
primary The law should be changed so as to allow a candidate in the
primary who raises the threshold amount to receive state funds regardless
if he or she has a viable party opponent. Finally, the distinction between
independent expenditures and coordinated expenditures needs to be
clarified in order to prevent candidates from exceeding the overall
expenditure limit unknowingly Each of these proposals present important
solutions and must be examined; however, it is important to note that
Kentucky has come a long way since the days of BOPTROT and
excessive spending in gubernatorial races. Kentucky's campaign finance
reform laws, and especially the public financing of the governor's race,
should serve as a model to other states with increasing campaign costs.

